LES ARMES CACHEES DE L'IRAK
Mise à jour: 22/02/05
Table des matières
2 Les Américains ont trouvé 3 laboratoires mobiles d'armes bactériologiques
3 Le dernier programme d'inspections proposé par M. Blix
4 Extraits du rapport Hans Blix du 07/03/2003 (49)
5 Extraits du rapport Hans Blix du 27/01/2003 (36)
5.1 L'attitude de l'Irak et les questions posées par l'ONU aux inspecteurs de l'UNMOVIC
5.2 Le point sur les armes de destruction massive au 27/01/2003
5.3 Exemple de danger: arme basée sur le virus de la variole
6 Extraits du rapport de l'ONU S/1999/94 du 29/01/1999
6.2 L'Irak a organisé la dissimulation de ses armes de destruction massive
Les références comme (36) permettent d'accéder aux documents correspondants. L'ensemble de ces sources est dans le document "Sources", disponible à l'adresse ../US/Sources.htm.
Ce texte du 29/06/2003 explique bien le but véritable et la nature des armes de destruction massive de l'Irak, ainsi que la menace qui en résultait et la nécessité d'y répondre.
Dans un communiqué de presse daté du 13/05/2003 et intitulé "U.S. Troops Find Second Biological Weapons Trailer Near Mosul - (Defense Department Report) (520)", le Département d'Etat (ministères des Affaires étrangères) des Etats-Unis confirme la découverte d'un second laboratoire mobile de production d'armes bactériologiques en Irak. Le premier laboratoire portait une date de fabrication en 2002, le second une date en 2003: Saddam Hussein continuait donc bien à fabriquer des armes de destruction massive pendant les inspections de l'ONU! Après découverte d'un troisième laboratoire mobile semblable aux deux autres, la CIA a publié le 28/05/2003 un rapport illustré complet (61) décrivant ces unités de production d'armes bactériologiques.
Malgré les affirmations de tous ceux qui refusent la vérité et nient l'existence d'armes de destruction massive en Irak, nous disposons là d'une preuve flagrante de l'aptitude de Saddam Hussein de fabriquer en quelques jours des bouillons de culture redoutables prêts à disperser pour tuer des milliers de personnes.
Selon le document (51) du 17 mars 2003, les armes de destruction massive qui pourraient encore se trouver en Irak et justifient des inspections font partie des domaines suivants (texte extrait du rapport (51) ):
15. Following is a list of the issues which UNMOVIC has identified as key disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq. They are set out in detail in Annex 1. Annex 2 contains the background information relating to each task identified, under a heading relating to that task.
- Scud missiles and associated biological and chemical warheads;
- SA-2 missile technology;
- Research and development on missiles capable of proscribed ranges;
- Munitions for Chemical and Biological agent fill (CBW);
- Spray devices and remotely piloted vehicles/unmanned aerial vehicles (RPVs/UAVs);
- VX and its precursors;
- Mustard gas and its precursors;
- Sarin, Cyclosarin and their precursors;
- Anthrax and its drying;
- Botulinum toxin;
- Undeclared agents, including smallpox; and
- Any proscribed activities post 1998.
Malgré les affirmations de l'Irak ("Nous n'avons pas d'armes de destruction massive") et les documents qu'ils ont remis aux inspecteurs jusqu'à la veille du déclenchement des hostilités, les Irakiens n'ont toujours pas répondu à certaines questions importantes que les inspecteurs leur posent depuis 1991. M. Blix affirme donc, pour la n-ème fois, qu'ils ont le devoir de répondre à ces questions et, plus généralement, de coopérer avec les inspecteurs.
16. Iraq has the primary duty to help resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks: to present proscribed items, to provide documents and other evidence, to present witnesses for interviews, etc. At the same time, UNMOVIC will use all its resources to verify Iraq’s declarations and the evidence presented.
Nous constatons, une fois de plus, que M. Blix ne parle pas de chercher des armes cachées, cette recherche ne faisant pas partie de sa mission.
Le 7 mars 2003 le docteur Hans Blix, président de la commission internationale d'inspection UNMOVIC, nommée par les Nations unies pour faire le point sur les armes de destruction massive de l'Irak (voir la mission dans le texte (35) ) a présenté verbalement un résumé du long document (48), qui fait le point sur l'avancement du désarmement de l'Irak par les inspections.
Les textes (48) et (49) montrent clairement que, plus de 3 mois après le début des inspections et la remise de son rapport de 12.000 pages, l'Irak n'a toujours pas satisfait les exigences du Conseil de sécurité concernant une coopération immédiate et complète: voir les extraits ci-dessous. La résolution 1441 prévoyant qu'en cas de coopération inadéquate l'Irak en subirait les graves conséquences, l'intervention militaire est justifiée.
Le résumé (49) contient notamment le texte suivant:
"while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as “active”, or even “proactive”, these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute “immediate” cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance."
qu'on peut traduire comme suit:
"Bien que les nombreuses initiatives prises désormais par les Irakiens pour répondre à des questions posées depuis longtemps puissent être considérées comme "actives" et même "proactives", à ce jour, 3 à 4 mois après la nouvelle résolution [1441], ces initiatives ne peuvent être qualifiées de "coopération immédiate" [c'est-à-dire que l'Irak ne répond toujours pas de manière satisfaisante à toutes les questions posées]. Ces initiatives ne répondent pas nécessairement à toutes les questions posées."
Le document (48) contient une longue liste de "problèmes non résolus" (UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES) dont voici la table des matières:
CLUSTERS OF UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES
CONTENTS
I. MISSILE CLUSTERS...................................................................................21 missiles........................................................................................21
a. Scud type Technology............................................................................27
b. SA-2 Missile
c. Research and development (R&D) on ballistic missiles capable of proscribed ranges.............................................................................................................31 Warheads.................................................................35
d. FROG (Luna) Special
e. Development of solid propellant missile systems before and after the Gulf War.................................................................................................................37
II. MUNITIONS AND OTHER DELIVERY MEANS, CLUSTERS............Warheads...........................................41
a. Scud-type Biological and Chemical Bombs...........................................................................41
b. R-400 and R-400A 45 Bombs....................................................................................49
c. Major Aerial Projectiles......................................................53
d. Major Rockets and Artillery Vehicles............................................57
e. Spray devices and Remotely Piloted munitions..................................................63
f. Other Chemical and Biological CLUSTERS.........................................................................
III. CHEMICAL Tabun...........................................................................................................67
a. 67 Cyclosarin....................................................................................71
b. Sarin and Mustard........................................................................................................75
c. VX................................................................................................................79
d. Equipment............................................................85
e. Major Chemical Process Soman...........................................................................................................
f. 89 compounds)..................................................93
g. BZ Analogues (psychoactive CLUSTERS.....................................................................
IV. BIOLOGICAL Anthrax.........................................................................................................95
a. 95 Toxin..........................................................................................99
b. Botulinum Trichothecenes..............................................103
c. Mycotoxins: Aflatoxin and smut.....................................................................................
d. Wheat cover 107 perfringens............................................................................111
e. Clostridium Ricin..........................................................................................................115
f. agents.............................................................................117
g. Undeclared BW Agents...............................................................................119
h. Drying of BW production.................................................................123
i. Bacterial BW agent Research..................................................127
j. Genetic Engineering and Viral Simulants................................................................................
k. BW Agent 131
Le document (48) contient aussi une liste de ce que les inspecteurs attendent toujours de l'Irak:
Iraq will need to provide more information to support its declaration and other statements concerning activities during the past four years in engender confidence that no proscribed activities occurred in a period when no inspectors were present.
Based on the above considerations, UNMOVIC has developed some ideas of the type of information that could assist. UNMOVIC suggestions of required Iraqi actions include:
· Fully declare the names of individuals who have been associated with Iraq’s proscribed programmes.
· Provide the employment records, from 1998 to present, of the above individuals.
· Facilitate the granting of interviews in private to UNMOVIC by individuals identified by UNMOVIC as being relevant to the resolution of disarmament issues in Iraq.
· Provide complete supplier information for items Iraq has declared purchased from the “local market”. Most such items have been clearly identified through inspections as foreign made and have not been processed through the UN export/import mechanism. The information to be provided should include the full name and address of the foreign supplier(s) and all intermediary persons, banks, companies, government institutions, etc., both Iraqi and foreign, involved.
· Provide full cooperation in the establishment by UNMOVIC of a system of road/rail traffic monitoring in Iraq and facilitate its implementation.
· Explain, with credible evidence, the purposes for which the various RPV/UAV platforms were created and provide the full names, Iraqi and foreign, of all organizations, institutions etc., and the associated persons involved.
· Provide details on imports for the RPV/UAV programme, such as the supply of engines, GPS guidance systems, airframes, etc. and include the full name and address of the foreign supplier(s) and all intermediary persons, banks, companies, government institutions, etc., both Iraqi and foreign, involved.
Le 27/01/2003, M. Hans Blix a présenté au Conseil de sécurité le rapport (36) dont voici quelques extraits. Ceux-ci montrent que l'Iraq cache:
· environ 6500 bombes chimiques, représentant quelques 1000 tonnes d'agents chimiques;
· une quantité de bacilles du charbon (anthrax) suffisante pour produire environ 5000 litres de solution concentrée;
· un agent innervant très puissant, le VX, à l'état militarisé;
· plusieurs milliers de missiles à charge chimique;
· des missiles d'une portée et d'une taille supérieures aux limites autorisées de 150 km et 600 mm, opérationnels dans l'armée irakienne, en violation flagrante des résolutions de l'ONU;
· l'importation jusqu'en décembre 2002 de matériel militaire prohibé, notamment 380 moteurs de missile à portée plus longue que la limite autorisée de 150 km.
(A ce jour et depuis 1991, l'Irak n'a jamais respecté correctement les exigences des Nations unies. Celles-ci lui ont donc imposé des sanctions. Très dures, ces sanctions ont provoqué en Irak une grande misère; elles ont donc été commuées en programme "Pétrole contre nourriture". Périodiquement, le Conseil de sécurité s'est réuni depuis 1991 pour faire le point sur le respect par l'Irak de ses engagements et à chaque fois il a reconduit les sanctions: c'est la preuve que jusqu'à ce jour le Conseil de sécurité considère que l'Irak n'a pas encore respecté ses engagements en matière d'armes de destruction massive.)
"Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament, which was demanded of it…"
"As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed in the short time expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme"
"One of three important questions before us today is:
§ How much might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter;
§ The second question is what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors left;
§ And the third question is how it can be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future.
(Les passages ci-dessous du rapport de M. Blix donnent une quasi-certitude qu'il existe encore des armes de destruction massive cachées et que l'Irak fait le maximum pour dissimuler ces armes).
"The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared. There are also indications that the agent was weaponised."
"I would now like to turn to the so-called "Air Force document" that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC. The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.
The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for."
"I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one. Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction. There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist."
As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document (34), but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered. In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that "all imported quantities of growth media were declared". This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax."
"There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions. Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development."
"The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.
During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles. In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure.
In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km.
Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2. Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.
Une étude publiée le 23/12/2002 par l'université Johns Hopkins (39) a montré que l'introduction de quelques spores de la variole en 2 ou 3 points des Etats-Unis se traduirait en quelques mois par des centaines de milliers de morts.
Le document (31) contenant ce rapport étant très long à télécharger et à lire, j'en ai extrait ci-dessous quelques passages que j'ai commentés. Le rapport provient de Richard BUTLER, président de la commission internationale UNSCOM chargée par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU de trouver et de détruire les armes de destruction massive irakiennes en se basant notamment sur les déclarations des Irakiens.
"17. In response to the Commission's requests for relevant documents, Iraq has repeatedly claimed that they no longer exist or cannot be located, a claim which often has been shown to be false, either because inspection activities have in fact located precisely such documents or because Iraq has reversed its stated position and then produced relevant documents."
"63. In contravention of the requirements of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq did not declare its efforts to produce guidance and control (G&C) instruments for its Al Hussein class missiles. After the Commission discovered, in August 1991, a facility for the development and production of such components, Iraq declared reverse-engineering efforts in this area."
Appendix III
"Iraq did not acknowledge its proscribed Biological Warfare (BW) weapons programme until July 1995. From the first UNSCOM inspections in 1991 until 1995 Iraq denied it had a BW programme and has taken active steps to conceal it from the Special Commission. These steps included fraudulent statements, forged documents, misrepresentation of the roles of people and facilities, and other specific acts of deception."
"Concealment and Deception:
Since its disclosures in 1995 Iraq has continued to deceive the Commission and conceal parts of its BW [Biological Weapons] programme. This includes efforts to hide documents, media, equipment and operating locations."
"In 1995, when Iraq was confronted with evidence collected by the Commission of imports of bacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian utility within Iraq’s limited biotechnology industry, it eventually, on 1 July 1995, acknowledged that it used this growth media to produce two BW agents in bulk, botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis spores. Iraq acknowledged that it had had an offensive BW programme, but denied weaponization. Subsequently, in August 1995, after the departure of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents and had deployed them for combat use."
Appendix IV: ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT
"32. The Commission has received information recently from multiple sources, identifying organizations that direct and implement the concealment effort in Iraq. While the information from these sources differs in some minor details, it agrees on several major points:
- The highest level of concealment-related decisions are made by a small committee of high ranking officials. The Presidential Secretary, Abed Hamid Mahmoud, chairs this committee;
- The Committee directs the activities of a unit which is responsible for moving, hiding, and securing the items which are being concealed from the Commission;"
(Cette position absurde est aussi celle du gouvernement français et celle qu'a prise M. François Bayrou dans le journal de l'UDF "Démocratie info" n° 73 du 13 janvier 2003, dont l'éditorial est intitulé "IRAK – Notre ligne: pas de preuves, pas de guerre")
"19. In August 1998, Iraq declared that unless the Commission could demonstrate that Iraq retained prohibited items, then it must declare that Iraq had fully implemented its obligations under section C of resolution 687. This is contrary to the system established by the Council which imposed upon Iraq the obligation of full disclosure and upon the Commission the duty to verify those disclosures."
(Ce qui explique pourquoi les Américains veulent, après une nouvelle guerre et la destruction des armes irakiennes trouvées, chasser Saddam Hussein et son régime: il faut l'empêcher de recommencer à se doter d'armes qu'il pourrait ensuite utiliser ou donner à des terroristes.)
"88. Through its disarmament and monitoring inspections, the Commission obtained evidence that, after adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991), Iraq undertook, in parallel to its activities declared under the Commission’s Monitoring Plan, covert activities that were not in conformity with the requirements of those resolutions and the obligations of Iraq. The established cases of covert activities included:
- Retention of production equipment, tooling, missile components and documentation which were acquired or used by Iraq for production of proscribed missiles and would be required for similar proscribed activities in the future;
- Work on proscribed key missile components and designs; importation of proscribed missile components and secret acquisition of items declarable under the Monitoring plan;
- Concealment of ballistic missile projects and facilities specifically established for missile-related production."
"90. The evidence available to the Commission and presented in this report shows that:
- at the time of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq took a decision to retain, by a variety of methods, practically all available capabilities for the production of proscribed missiles, in particular liquid propellant missiles of Al Hussein class;
- in spite of the decision to unilaterally destroy all remaining prohibited items in July 1991, secret efforts were made to preserve essential capabilities for resumption of proscribed activities in the future;
- facilities in Iraq were tasked to undertake proscribed activities or carry out, in secret, activities that Iraq was obliged to declare under the Monitoring Plan."
(L'Irak a fourni à la commission UNSCOM plusieurs versions successives de sa liste d'armes appelée FFCD "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure". En vérifiant ces documents, l'UNSCOM a prouvé que les justifications de destructions fournies par les Irakiens sont fausses. Il existe donc encore de nombreuses armes non détruites, qui sont donc cachées.)
"Since its first revelations in July 1995, Iraq has submitted three "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures" (FFCDs) of its proscribed biological programme. The first of these, presented in August 1995, was declared null and void by Iraq itself. The second, submitted in June 1996, was subjected to intensive efforts to verify its accuracy and completeness through eight inspections and other technical discussions. In March 1997 an international panel of experts reviewed that FFCD and recommended its rejection because of the inadequacy of the material presented throughout the document."
"The experts found that much of the information collected by the Commission to verify the FFCD in fact contradicts statements therein, particularly the evidence regarding weaponization, the quantity of agents produced and the media balance."
"The Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed; that no BW munitions or weapons remain in Iraq; and that a BW capability does not still exist in Iraq."
"The Commission has little or no confidence in Iraq’s accounting for proscribed items for which physical evidence is lacking or inconclusive, documentation is sparse or nonexistent, and coherence and consistency is lacking. These include, for example: quantities and types of munitions available for BW filling; quantities and types of munitions filled with BW agents; quantities and type of bulk agents produced; quantities of bulk agents used in filling; quantities of bulk agents destroyed; quantities of growth media acquired for the programme; and quantities of growth media used/consumed."
"On four occasions, during the last 18 months, international experts have concluded unanimously that Iraq's current disclosure statement in this area [biological weapons] is deeply deficient and does not provide a basis for any credible level of verification."